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STATUTES-REFERENDUM-APPROPRIATION-STADIUM 
ENACTMENTS NOT SUBJECT TO REFERENDUM BECAUSE 
THEY FALL WITHIN APPROPRIATION EXCEPTION TO REF-
ERENDUM AMENDMENT. Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, 
Inc., 310 Md. 437, 530 A.2d 245 (1987). 
For more than seventy years, Marylanders have possessed the power 
to place an enactment of the General Assembly on the ballot for referen-
dum.1 This power, however, is subject to several restrictions. In particu-
lar, the Maryland Constitution exempts from referendum any 
"appropriation for maintaining the state govemment."2 In Kelly v. 
Marylanders for Sports Sanity, Inc., 3 the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that the Stadium Enactments, which enabled the construction of 
professional sports facilities in Maryland, were not referable because they 
constituted an appropriation for maintaining the state govemment.4 By 
construing the appropriations exception to the power of referendum 
broadly, the Kelly decision has not denied the people's right to referen-
dum; instead, it has preserved the integrity of our representative system 
of self-government. 
Article XVI of the Maryland Constitution provides: 
The people reserve to themselves power known as The Referen-
dum, by petition to have submitted to the registered voters of 
the State, to approve or reject at the polls, any Act, or part of 
any Act ofthe General Assembly, if approved by the Governor, 
or, if passed by the General Assembly over the veto of the 
Govemor.5 
The Referendum Amendment was designed to deter corruption and 
abuses which had crept into legislation and public administration by re-
serving to the people of the State the right to approve or reject any law 
passed by the legislature. 6 Article XVI was intended to preserve Mary-
1. Mo. CONST. art. XVI, § 1. 
2. /d.§ 2. 
3. 310 Md. 437, 530 A.2d 245 (1987). 
4. /d. at 463-68, 530 A.2d at 258-60. 
5. Mo. CONST. art. XVI, § l(a). 
6. In Beall v. State ex rei. Jenkins, 131 Md. 669, 103 A. 99 (1917), the court analyzed 
the legislative history of the Referendum Amendment in considering whether article 
III, section 31 of the Maryland Constitution was subject to the provisions of article 
XVI. In its discussion, the court recognized that Marylanders have lived under a 
form of representative self-government since the establishment of Maryland's first 
constitution. Id. at 677, 103 A. at 102. Founded on the early legal institutions of 
England, this form of government was brought to America by the colonists who 
incorporated it into their governmental systems and ultimately into the constitu-
tions of the respective states and the United States Constitution. For many years, 
this representative system was considered one of the great principles of popular gov-
ernment. /d. After the Civil War, abuses crept into legislation and into the admin-
istration of the government, especially between the years 1880 and 1900. It was 
charged that government had been "prostituted to corrupt and selfish purposes" by 
powerful corporations and individuals who had gained control of the machinery of 
the political parties. Jd. 
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land's form of representative self-government by thwarting the perver-
sion of the political system for the benefit of private interests contrary to 
the will of the majority. 7 
The power to petition acts by referendum, however, is subject to 
certain exceptions. One such exception is that an act which contains an 
appropriation for maintaining the state government is not referable. 8 For 
an act to fall within this exception, two requirements must be satisfied. 
First, it must be established that the act authorizes an appropriation of 
public funds. Second, the appropriation must be used for the mainte-
nance of the state government.9 
There are two conflicting definitions of appropriation extant in 
Maryland. The first definition is found in section 32 of article III of the 
Maryland Constitution. This section provides that money may be drawn 
from the treasury only upon appropriation which specifies the amount 
appropriated and the object to which it shall be applied. 10 The second 
definition of appropriation appears in the Budget Amendment which was 
enacted subsequent to the passage of the Referendum Amendment. The 
Budget Amendment requires that all appropriations be made specifically 
in the form of either a budget bill or a supplementary appropriation 
bill.'' Because the definition of appropriation under the Budget Amend-
ment requires a withdrawal of funds to be made in a specific procedural 
form, it is a more restrictive definition than that contained in section 32 
of article III of the Maryland Constitution. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland first examined the disparity in 
the definitions of appropriation in Dorsey v. Petrott. 12 Dorsey involved 
an act which replaced the State Conservation Commission with two com-
missions, one for tidewater fisheries and the other for game and inland 
fisheries. 13 After analyzing the evolution of the budget process in Mary-
land, the court found that the determinative characteristics of an appro-
priation at the time the Referendum Amendment was adopted were not 
fundamentally affected by the Budget Amendment. 14 The court applied 
a broader definition of appropriation similar to that contained in section 
32 of article III of the Maryland Constitution but found that, even under 
the less stringent standard, the act sought to be referred was not an 
7. /d. 
8. Mo. CONST. art. XVI, § 2. Section 2 also excludes from referendum any law "for 
maintaining or aiding any public institution, not exceeding the next previous appro-
priation for the same purpose .... " /d. The only other exception is contained in 
section 6 of article XVI and applies to the manufacture and sale of liquor. /d. § 6. 
9. See Bayne v. Secretary of State, 283 Md. 560, 570, 392 A.2d 67, 72 (1978). 
10. Mo. CONST. art. III, § 32. 
11. /d. § 52. The purpose of that amendment was to require the executive to submit a 
complete and unified plan of proposed expenditures and estimated revenues for each 
fiscal year, thereby facilitating the management of the budget. See Dorsey v. Pe-
trott, 178 Md. 230, 241-43, 13 A.2d 630, 636-37 (1940). 
12. 178 Md. 230, 13 A.2d 630 (1940). 
13. /d. at 245-46, 13 A.2d at 638. 
14. /d. at 241, 13 A.2d at 636. 
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appropriation. 15 
Defining appropriation as "a lawful legislative act whose primary 
object is to authorize the withdrawal from the state treasury of a certain 
sum of money for a specified public object or purpose,"16 the Dorsey 
court noted that the only items in the act approaching appropriations 
were a cap set on salaries for the new commissioners and a provision for 
the collection of inspection fees and fines.'7 The act, however, did not 
regulate the manner in which public funds were to be supplied annually 
for the conservation of tidewater fisheries. 18 The court reasoned that an 
act which related primarily and specifically to general legislation could 
not be converted into an appropriation bill merely because there was an 
incidental provision for an appropriation of public funds. 19 Accordingly, 
the court concluded that the act did not make an appropriation and, 
therefore, was subject to referendum under section 1 of article XVI. 
Once it has been established that an act authorizes an appropriation 
of public funds, the next inquiry is whether the appropriation is for main-
taining the state government. The Court of Appeals of Maryland first 
addressed this issue in Winebrenner v. Salmon. 20 In Winebrenner, the 
plaintiffs petitioned for the referendum of an act which increased a fuel 
tax to provide for the construction of lateral roads within the State.21 
The court held that the fuel tax was being utilized for maintaining the 
state government and, therefore, the act was exempt from referendum 
under section 2 of article XVI of the Maryland Constitution.22 
In reaching this holding, the Winebrenner court construed the 
"maintaining the state government" exception broadly. The court rea-
soned that the purpose of the exception "was to provide against the pos-
sibility of the government being embarrassed in the performance of its 
various functions," presumably by depriving a government of funds nec-
essary to meet its obligations.23 The court found that "maintaining the 
state government means providing money to enable it to perform the du-
ties which it is required by law to perform."24 The Winebrenner court 
then addressed whether the construction of state roads was a duty which 
the government was required to perform. Finding that the construction 
of state roads constituted just such a duty of government, the court char-
acterized this duty as an "important" and "primary function" of govern-
15. /d. at 245-52, 13 A.2d at 637-41. 
16. /d. at 245, 13 A.2d at 637-38 (emphasis added). 
17. /d. at 246, 250, 13 A.2d at 638, 640. 
18. /d. at 250, 13 A.2d at 640. The act remitted to the budget bill the designation and 
allowance of salaries, subject only to the cap contained in the act. The inspection 
fees and fines were to be paid directly to the Comptroller of the Treasury with no 
specific provision for their disbursement. /d. 
19. /d. at 251, 13 A.2d at 640. 
20. 155 Md. 563, 142 A. 723 (1928). 
21. /d. at 565-66, 142 A. at 724. 
22. See id. at 567-68, 142 A. at 725. 
23. /d. at 568, 142 A. at 725. 
24. /d. 
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ment. 25 The court, however, noted that an appropriation would not fall 
within the appropriations exception if it "created an entirely new func-
tion not theretofore recognized as coming within the sphere of govern-
mental activity."26 Thus, Winebrenner defined "maintaining the state 
government" as providing money to perform a primary function of gov-
ernment which is not newly created. 
The next case to interpret the "appropriation for maintaining the 
state government" exception was Bickel v. Nice. 21 The petitioners in 
Bickel sought the referendum of an act that authorized the issuance of 
bonds to finance the construction and furnishing of a new state office 
building. 28 Adopting the reasoning in Winebrenner which equated pri-
mary function with maintaining the state government, the Bickel court 
found that housing state officers and employees was a "primary function 
of government. " 29 The court recognized that the judicial branch cannot 
pass upon the need for, or wisdom of, a particular appropriation because 
such determinations are reserved to the legislature.30 Accordingly, the 
court found that its inquiry ended with the determination of whether the 
appropriation was designed to maintain the state government.31 
Bayne v. Secretary of State 32 is the most recent case prior to Kelly v. 
Marylanders for Sports Sanity, Inc. 33 to address the issue of whether an 
appropriation was for maintaining the state government. In Bayne, the 
petitioners sought to refer a· portion of the 1979 Budget Bill authorizing 
Medicaid payments for abortions for indigent persons. 34 The court ac-
cepted the Winebrenner/Bickel formulation that performing a primary 
function of government equals maintaining the state government. 35 The 
court traced the history of numerous state laws providing medical serv-
ices for indigent persons, demonstrating that Medicaid payments were 
not a "new" function of government.36 Further, the court noted that the 
Department of Health & Mental Hygiene is one of the most "important" 
agencies of the state and that providing medical services to indigent per-
sons was a primary function of government. 37 Having found that the 
provision of medical services for indigent persons was a long-standing, 
25. Id.; see also Bonsai v. Yellot, 100 Md. 481, 60 A. 593 (1905). 
26. Winebrenner, 155 Md. at 568, 142 A. at 725. 
27. 173 Md. 1, 192 A. 777 (1937). 
28. ld. at 3-4, 192 A. at 778-79. 
29. Id. at 10, 192 A. at 781. 
30. Id. at 11, 192 A. at 782. 
31. ld. at 10, 192 A. at 781. 
32. 283 Md. 560, 392 A.2d 67 (1978). 
33. 310 Md. 437, 530 A.2d 245 (1987). 
34. Bayne, 283 Md. at 563, 392 A.2d at 68-69. 
35. I d. at 575, 392 A.2d at 75. Indeed, the per curiam opinion in Bayne left no room for 
doubt. The court stated: "No law making any appropriation for maintaining the 
State Government may be subject to The Referendum. If an appropriation is for a 
primary function of the State, it is for maintaining the State Government." Id. 
36. Id. at 570-71, 392 A.2d at 72-73; see also supra text accompanying note 26. 
37. Bayne, 283 Md. at 570-71, 392 A.2d at 72-73. 
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primary function of government, the court held that the appropriation 
was for maintaining the state government and, therefore, was not subject 
to referendum. 38 
A final consideration in determining whether an act may be referred 
is whether that portion of the act which constitutes an appropriation for 
maintaining the state government may be severed from the remainder of 
the act. The Referendum Amendment in the Maryland Constitution 
reserves the power to refer any act or "part of any act" to the voters of 
the State. 39 Dicta in the Winebrenner case supports the conclusion that 
parts of an act may be subject to referendum even though the act con-
tains an appropriation which is not subject to referendum.40 In Mayor of 
Berlin v. Shockley,41 however, the court of appeals refused to follow the 
dicta enunciated in Winebrenner. 42 Instead, the court held that if a single 
enactment incorporates both a referable law and "one of the kinds ex-
cepted from the referendum," that law cannot be referred.43 
Whether one act embodied in a single legislative scheme may be re-
ferred, however, was left open by the court of appeals decision in Shock-
ley.44 Under Maryland law, the General Assembly may embody a single 
legislative scheme in associated bills or acts,45 and the principles of sever-
38. /d. at 572-73, 392 A.2d at 73-74. 
39. Mo. CONST. art. XVI, § 1(a). 
40. Winebrenner v. Salmon, 155 Md. 563, 571, 142 A. 723, 726 (1928). 
41. 174 Md. 442, 199 A. 500 (1938). Shockley addressed the referendum of an act in-
volving distribution of profits from a county dispensary's sale of alcoholic beverages. 
Although this case did not involve the question of referendum of an act appropriat-
ing funds for maintaining the state government, it did involve the sale of alcoholic 
beverages, which is similarly excepted from referendum under section 6 of article 
XVI of the Maryland Constitution. /d. at 444, 199 A. at 500. 
42. /d. at 44-46, 199 A. at 501. The Shockley court cited the statement in Winebrenner 
that the Referendum Amendment expressly provides for submission of "part of any 
act" and that part of an excepted law might be referred. The court, however, held 
that "the constitutional provision does not permit it." The court stated that: 
An association in a single enactment of a referable law and one of the 
kinds excepted from the referendum ... might, perhaps, be found to leave 
part of an enactment referable, but not part of the excepted law. That law, 
with its incidents, still could not be referred. 
/d. at 446, 199 A. at 501; see also Bayne v. Secretary of State, 283 Md. 560, 575, 392 
A.2d 67, 75. 
43. Shockley, 174 Md. at 445-46, 199 A. at 501. 
44. See id. at 446, 199 A. at 501; see also Brief for Appellant Secretary of State at 48, 
Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, Inc., 310 Md. 437, 530 A.2d 245 (1987) 
(No. 75). Other states, however, have applied the principles of severability of parts 
of a unified scheme in the context of referendum, holding that the exception of one 
act excepts all associated acts in the scheme. See, e.g., County Rd. Ass'n v. Board of 
State Canvassers, 407 Mich. 101, 118-121,282 N.W.2d 774,780-81 (1979); Board of 
County Rd. Comm'rs v. Riley, 391 Mich. 666,673-74,218 N.W.2d 144, 147 (1974) 
(holding that all associated acts were exempt from referendum); State ex ref. Barrett 
v. Dallmeyer, 245 S.W. 1066, 1068 (Mo. 1922) (holding that referendum of one act 
which was in pari materia with another necessarily suspended the second act-the 
act in question did not fall within the exception from referendum). 
45. See Ocean City Taxpayers for Equal Rights, Inc. v. Mayor of Ocean City, 280 Md. 
585, 597, 375 A.2d 541, 548 (1977). 
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ability are applicable to a unified legislative scheme. 46 In Ocean City 
Taxpayers for Equal Rights, Inc. v. Mayor of Ocean City,47 the Maryland 
Court of Appeals considered three factors in determining whether acts 
should be construed together as a unified legislative scheme.4s The first 
factor is whether each enactment in the scheme makes reference to any 
other enactment in the title or body.49 The second factor is whether the 
individual enactments cover the same subject matter.50 The final factor 
focuses on whether the legislature intended the individual enactments to 
constitute a unified legislative scheme.51 
In Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, Inc., 52 the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland examined whether the legislation known as the "Sta-
dium Enactments" was subject to referendum under article XVI of the 
Maryland Constitution. 53 Chapter 122 of the Stadium Enactments au-
thorizes the Maryland Stadium Authority (the "Authority")54 to con-
struct a stadium facility at Camden Yards in Baltimore, Maryland (the 
"Site").55 Chapter 123 designates the Authority as an independent unit 
of the executive branch of state government, directs deposit of receipts 
into the Authority's financing fund and authorizes the Authority to ac-
quire the Site by condemnation. 56 Finally, chapter 124 of the Stadium 
Enactments outlines the Authority's power to issue bonds for site acqui-
sition and construction of the facility, provides for lease payments to the 
Authority appropriated by the legislature, creates a special, non-lapsing 
fund for receipts and disbursements designated for the facility, provides 
for a dedicated purpose account in the state reserve fund to cover debt 
service on the Authority's bonds and authorizes the State lottery agency 
to conduct sports lotteries annually for the benefit of the stadium facili-
ties fund. 57 
Opponents of the Stadium Enactments, acting through Marylanders 
46. See id. at 599, 375 A.2d at 549. 
47. 280 Md. 585, 375 A.2d 541 (1977). 
48. ld. at 596-601, 375 A.2d at 548-50. 
49. /d. at 597-98, 375 A.2d at 548-49. This factor focuses on the form of acts within the 
statutory scheme. 
50. /d. at 598, 375 A.2d at 549. This factor examines the acts to determine whether 
they are connected in substance. 
51. /d. at 598-99, 375 A.2d at 549. The legislative history of the resolutions is examined 
under this factor. 
52. 310 Md. 437, 530 A.2d 245 (1987). 
53. ld. at 473, 530 A.2d at 262-63. 
54. At the time, the Maryland Stadium Authority was an instrumentality of the State 
and a unit of the Department of Economic and Community Development. Mo. 
FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 13-702 (1986 & Supp. 1988). 
55. Act of April 29, 1987, ch. 122, 1987 Md. Laws 802 (codified at Mo. FIN. INST. 
CODE ANN. § 13-709 (Supp. 1988)). 
56. Act of April 29, 1987, ch. 123, 1987 Md. Laws 805 (codified in scattered sections of 
Mo. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. and Mo. STATE FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN.). 
57. Act of April29, 1987, ch. 124, 1987 Md. Laws 815 (codified in scattered sections of 
Mo. FIN. INST. CODE ANN., Mo. STATE FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. and Mo. 
STATE Gov'T CODE ANN.). 
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for Sports Sanity ("MASS"), presented referendum petitions for chapters 
122 and 124 to the Secretary of State. 5 8 The Secretary refused to accept 
the petitions, relying on an Attorney General opinion which found that 
neither law was referable. 59 The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County 
granted MASS's request for a writ of mandamus compelling the Secre-
tary to accept the petitions. The Secretary appealed to the court of spe-
cial appeals. 60 While the appeal was pending in the court of special 
appeals, the court of appeals granted certiorari to expedite "the signifi-
cant issue of public importance involved in [Kelly]."61 
The petitioners in Kelly presented three issues for resolution by the 
court of appeals. The first issue required the court to focus on whether 
chapter 124 of the Stadium Enactments, which authorized the financing 
for the acquisition and construction of the stadium, constituted an appro-
priation within the meaning of the Referendum Amendment. 62 In deter-
mining that chapter 124 was a law making an appropriation, the Kelly 
court followed the Dorsey ruling that the Budget Amendment did not 
affect the definition of appropriation for purposes of referendum. 63 
Although recognizing that chapter 124 did not meet the Budget Amend-
ment's stringent definition of "appropriation,"64 the court found that 
chapter 124 was an appropriation as contemplated in the Referendum 
Amendment because it set aside money for a particular purpose to the 
exclusion of all other purposes. 65 
Having established that chapter 124 authorized an appropriation of 
public funds, the Kelly court next considered whether the appropriation 
was for the purpose of maintaining the state government and, therefore, 
exempt from referendum under article XVI of the Maryland Constitu-
tion.66 The court found that because chapter 124 was an appropriation 
for a long-standing governmental function, it constituted an appropria-
tion for maintaining the state government.67 The court reasoned that 
58. Kelly, 310 Md. at 446-47, 530 A.2d at 249. Enactment of chapter 123 was made 
contingent on the enactment of chapter 122. /d. at 442, 530 A.2d at 247. There-
fore, the referendum of chapter 122 would suspend the operation of chapter 123 
until after the election. 
59. /d. at 447, 530 A.2d at 249. The Attorney General concluded that chapter 124 was 
an appropriation, that the appropriation made in chapter 124 was for maintaining 
the state government and that because of their interrelationship, neither chapter 122 
nor chapter 124 could be referred. 72 Op. Att'y Gen. 117, 129, 135, 139 (1987). 
60. Kelly, 310 Md. at 449-50, 530 A.2d at 251. 
61. /d. at 450 n.5, 530 A.2d at 251 n.5. 
62. /d. at 450, 530 A.2d at 251. Chapter 124 authorizes the Authority to deposit mon-
ies derived from the various revenue mechanisms contained in the act to a financing 
fund from which it may expend those dedicated funds for site acquisition and sta-
dium construction. /d. at 459-60, 530 A.2d at 256. 
63. /d. at 459, 530 A.2d at 256; see also supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text. 
64. Kelly, 310 Md. at 456, 530 A.2d at 254; see also supra note 11 and accompanying 
text. 
65. Kelly, 310 Md. at 456, 530 A.2d at 254. 
66. /d. at 461-68, 530 A.2d at 257-60. 
67. /d. at 467, 530 A.2d at 259-60. 
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providing sports facilities for public recreation was a valid public purpose 
that was not a new function of Maryland's government. 68 
In arriving at this conclusion, the court rejected the "primary," "im-
perative" and "important" characterizations made in the previous 
cases, 69 stating that it never intended these characterizations to be used 
as the test for determining whether an appropriation was for maintaining 
the state government.70 The court refused to "second guess" the legisla-
ture's determination that the appropriation was for maintaining the state 
government.71 Accordingly, the court adopted the Bickel reasoning that 
if the legislation was designed for a public purpose, it was for maintain-
ing the state government, regardless of its character or wisdom. 72 
Finally, the court addressed whether chapter 122 of the Stadium 
Enactments, which designated the site for stadium construction but con-
tained no appropriation language, was nevertheless exempt from referen-
dum because it could not be severed from the appropriations contained in 
chapter 124.73 Finding that chapters 122 and 124 were not severable, the 
court concluded that chapter 122 was not subject to referendum. The 
court enunciated three premises for reaching this conclusion. First, the 
court noted that the legislative history of the Stadium Enactments indi-
cated that the enactments were introduced and considered by the legisla-
ture as a single package. 74 This common origin of the Stadium 
Enactments signified that the General Assembly intended the acts to be 
construed as a unified statutory scheme. 75 Second, the court found that 
the goal of the exceptions to the Referendum Amendment was to protect 
the "purpose or object of the legislative appropriation."76 Accordingly, 
the court reasoned that if any of the bills were referred, all of them would 
be suspended because of their interdependence, thereby jeopardizing the 
68. Id. The Kelly court cited several cases for the proposition that encouraging profes-
sional sports was a governmental function, including Reyes v. Prince Georges 
County, 281 Md. 279, 381 A.2d 12 (1977) (sports arena); Pressman v. D'Alesandro, 
193 Md. 672, 69 A.2d 453 (1949) (Baltimore stadium); Green v. Garrett, 192 Md. 
52, 63 A.2d 326 (1949) (a valid public purpose exists in permitting use of Baltimore 
stadium for professional baseball). Kelly, 310 Md. at 461-62, 530 A.2d at 257. The 
court also noted many other jurisdictions where sports stadiums are publicly owned, 
such as Three Rivers Stadium owned by the Pittsburgh Stadium Authority and the 
Tampa Stadium owned by the Tampa Sports Authority. Id. at 462-63, 530 A.2d at 
257-58. In addition, the court noted that Maryland had authorized the expenditure 
of over forty million dollars for construction of the original Baltimore stadium. !d. 
at 462 n.15, 530 A.2d at 257 n.15. 
69. See supra text accompanying notes 25, 29, 37-38. 
70. Kelly, 310 Md. at 466, 530 A.2d at 259. 
71. Id. at 467-68, 530 A.2d at 260. 
72. ld. at 466, 530 A.2d at 259. 
73. Id. at 468-74, 530 A.2d at 260-63. 
74. Id. at 469, 530 A.2d at 261. 
75. ld. at 473, 530 A.2d at 262-63. 
76. /d. at 472, 530 A.2d at 262. One of the chief aims of the appropriation in chapter 
124 was to give the State the best possible chance to regain a professional football 
team upon expansion of the National Football League and to retain the Baltimore 
Orioles baseball franchise within the State. Id. at 471, 530 A.2d at 262. 
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goals of the appropriation." Third, the court found that chapter 122 was 
the "building block" on which the Stadium Enactments rested.78 Sepa-
rately, the bills could not have achieved their objective, and to refer chap-
ter 122 would have effectively scuttled the entire project. 79 Because 
chapter 124 was not subject to referendum and was dependent upon 
chapter 122, the court held that chapter 122 was not referable.80 To al-
low the referendum of chapter 122 would defeat the intent of the appro-
priation exception to referendum by constructively suspending the effect 
of chapter 124 until the referendum of chapter 122 was resolved at the 
polls. 81 
The Kelly court's conclusion that chapter 124 makes an appropria-
tion is consistent with previous decisions. Under the Dorsey decision, an 
appropriation need only meet the requirements similar to article III, sec-
tion 32 for the referendum exception to apply.82 Because the primary 
purpose of chapter 124 is to set aside certain money for the construction 
of a sports facility to the exclusion of all other purposes, it appears to 
comport with this definition of an appropriation. 83 
In determining whether an appropriation was for maintaining the 
state government, Maryland courts traditionally have applied a subjec-
tive "primary function" analysis. For example, in Winebrenner, the 
court of appeals labeled the establishment of roads as an "important" 
and "primary function" of government. 84 The Bickel court engaged in a 
comparison approach in which it found that housing for state employees 
is as much a primary function of government as constructing roads. 85 
Similarly, the Bayne decision recognized the "important" and "primary" 
function of providing for the health, safety, and welfare of indigent per-
sons. 86 This line of analysis permitted the court to judge arbitrarily 
whether a particular legislative enactment was important enough to be 
excepted from referendum. 87 The Kelly court, however, correctly re-
77. Id. at 474, 530 A.2d at 263. 
78. ld. at 473, 530 A.2d at 263. 
79. ld. at 474, 530 A.2d at 263. 
80. ld. at 473-74, 530 A.2d at 262-63. The financing arrangements contained in chapter 
124 were predicated upon timely approval of the Camden Yards site. Brieffor Ap-
pellant Greater Baltimore Committee at 40, Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, 
Inc., 310 Md. 437, 530 A.2d 245 (1987) (No. 75). 
81. Kelly, 310 Md. at 474, 530 A.2d at 263. 
82. See supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text. 
83. See supra notes 57, 62-65 and accompanying text. 
84. Winebrenner v. Salmon, 155 Md. 563, 568, 142 A. 723, 725 (1928); see also supra 
notes 20-26 and accompanying text. 
85. Bickel v. Nice, 193 Md. 1, 10, 192 A. 777, 781 (1937); see also supra notes 27-31 and 
accompanying text. 
86. Bayne v. Secretary of State, 283 Md. 560, 570, 392 A.2d 67, 72 (1978); see also supra 
notes 32-38 and accompanying text. 
87. In dissent, Judge Adkins argued that the "primary" and "important" qualifications 
to the appropriations exception were not arbitrary; rather, these qualifications were 
consistent with the fundamental purpose of the appropriations exception. See Kelly, 
310 Md. at 479-85, 530 A.2d at 266-69 (Adkins, J., dissenting). Noting that the 
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jected this subjective test, stating that it would not "second guess" the 
legislature. 88 Thus, by removing the subjective characterizations adopted 
since Winebrenner, the court has properly removed itself from the legis-
lative arena. Under this reasoning, if the legislature directs the perform-
ance of an activity which is a proper function of government, an 
appropriation designed to achieve this end is an appropriation for main-
taining the state government and is not referable. 
The Kelly decision correctly recognizes that Maryland has a repre-
sentative system of government with built-in checks and balances. The 
Referendum Amendment was adopted to remedy excesses, not to curb 
the representative process.89 The Camden Yards site was selected only 
after public input and careful consideration by Maryland's political rep-
resentatives.90 Solid economic benefits were anticipated as a result of the 
Stadium Enactments.91 A stadium would provide not only a source of 
public recreation, but would also create new businesses, jobs, tourism 
and national recognition, all of which accompany hosting professional 
baseball and football teams. Baltimore had already lost its professional 
football team, and the city needed a new stadium to be considered for an 
NFL expansion team.92 The Baltimore Orioles had also expressed dissat-
isfaction with the current stadium and refused to sign a long-term lease 
on the property.93 Furthermore, construction of a sports complex is con-
sistent with Maryland's long established policy of supporting profes-
sional sports within the State.94 Accordingly, the General Assembly's 
decision to construct a new stadium facility was reasonable in light of 
these economic and policy considerations. The Kelly court's decision 
appropriation exception was included in the Referendum Amendment to avoid the 
possibility of the government being embarrassed in the performance of its duties, 
Judge Adkins reasoned that such a situation would occur only when the appropria- . 
tion was for maintaining a primary or essential function of government. /d. at 483, 
530 A.2d at 267-68. But where the function of government was merely legally per-
missible rather than essential, Judge Adkins believed that "the people's right to de-
cide policy issues for themselves (the core purpose of the referendum) should 
prevail." /d. at 483, 530 A.2d at 268 (footnote omitted). Judge Adkins concluded 
that the construction of a sports stadium was not an essential function of govern-
ment and, therefore, that chapter 124 of the Stadium Enactments did not fall within 
the appropriations exception to the Referendum Amendment. 
88. /d. at 466-68, 530 A.2d at 259-60. 
89. /d. at 450-51, 530 A.2d at 251-52 (citing Beall v. State, 131 Md. 669, 676-78, 103 A. 
99, 102 (1917)). Indeed, in adopting the Referendum Amendment, proposals to 
abolish the representative system were rejected. See id. 
90. /d. at 440, 530 A.2d at 246; see also 72 Op. Att'y Gen. 117, 119 (1987); MD. FIN. 
INST. CODE ANN. § 13-710 (Supp. 1988). 
91. Expected economic benefits to the state were estimated at $132 million per year for 
the new baseball stadium and at $59.8 million if a football franchise was obtained. 
Benefits to the City of Baltimore were estimated at $9.6 million during construction 
and $1.6 million annually. Kelly, 310 Md. at 445-46, 530 A.2d at 249. 
92. /d. at 471, 530 A.2d at 262. 
93. /d. Subsequent to Kelly, the Orioles' owner did sign a long-term lease, thereby as-
suring that the baseball team would remain in Baltimore for another fifteen years. 
94. /d. at 462, 530 A.2d at 257. 
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that chapters 122 and 124 were not severable is also consistent with the 
spirit of Maryland's previous decisions regarding the Referendum. Prior 
to Kelly, the court of appeals had determined that when a single act con-
tained both referable and non-referable parts, the act could not be re-
ferred. 95 The rationale behind this conclusion was that a related or 
dependent portion of a non-referable act should not have to be stalled 
until the referable portion of the act was voted on at the polls, possibly 
years later.96 This same logic is readily transferrable to the unified legis-
lative scheme embodied in the Stadium Enactments. The referable chap-
ter in the Stadium Enactments, chapter 122, designates the site for 
stadium construction.97 Chapter 124, the non-referable part of the act, 
authorizes financing for the acquisition and construction of the stadium 
at the site.98 If chapter 122 were severed from the remaining acts in the 
legislative scheme, the financing provisions contained in chapter 124 
would be suspended until the outcome of the referendum. This result 
would effectively undermine the purpose of the Stadium Enactments -
the acquisition and construction of a sports stadium at Camden Yards. 
Accordingly, the Kelly court correctly applied the same analysis to deter-
mine the severability of the unified legislative scheme embodied in the 
Stadium Enactments as it had previously applied to determine the sever-
ability of portions of a single act. 
The Kelly court's construction of "appropriation" and "maintaining 
state government" makes it difficult to imagine any legislative measure 
which sets aside monies for a specific purpose as referable.99 The power 
of referendum, however, is not defeated by this construction. Many leg-
islative acts, including policy measures, do not make appropriations and 
thus continue to be subject to referendum. 100 Moreover, Maryland 
95. See Mayor of Berlin v. Shockley, 174 Md. 442, 199 A. 500 (1938); see also supra 
notes 39-43 and accompanying text. 
96. Shockley, 174 Md. at 446, 199 A. at 501. 
97. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
98. See supra notes 57, 62-65 and accompanying text. 
99. In the Winebrenner decision, the court hinted that this exception would not apply 
where the appropriation was for a "new" function of government. Winebrenner v. 
Salmon, 155 Md. 563, 142 A. 723 (1928). The closest the court of appeals has come 
to reviewing a "new" function was the funding of abortions to indigent persons. See 
Bayne v. Secretary of State, 283 Md. 560, 392 A.2d 67 (1978). There, the court 
looked to Maryland's history of providing health care to the indigent. See id. at 
570-71, 392 A.2d at 72-73. Kelly seems more similar to Bickel, where the State 
sought to build a new office building. See Bickel v. Nice, 173 Md. 1, 192 A. 777 
(1937). In Kelly, the State was merely seeking to build a new professional sports 
facility, a function which it had undertaken in the past. See supra note 68. 
100. For example, a measure abolishing the death penalty would not be excluded from 
referendum, nor would a measure making abortions illegal or a measure reassigning 
the power of appointment of school board officials. These policy issues would be 
referable so that each individual would have an opportunity to contribute to the 
decision. 
Referendum of the revamped Maryland handgun legislation in the fall of 1988 
illustrates the referendum's power and utility. Heated debate and copious advertis-
ing, especially by the National Rifle Association, gave the appearance that the bill 
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courts have refused to find that all appropriations are exempt from refer-
endum.101 In addition, the appropriations exception does not apply if the 
appropriation "created an entirely new function not theretofore recog-
nized as coming within the sphere of governmental activity." 102 This 
limitation provides a vehicle for future courts to narrow the breadth of 
the appropriations exception. 103 
The Kelly court's conclusion that the Stadium Enactments were not 
severable implicitly recognizes that the exception from referendum of ap-
propriations for maintaining state government facilitates the legislature 
in its dealings for the benefit of its citizens. Maryland must have credibil-
ity in its dealings in order to obtain favorable financing arrangements and 
to conduct business with other states and private industry. Permitting an 
appropriation measure contained in a unified legislative scheme to be 
stalled on referendum simply because the object of the appropriation was 
contained in a separate act would unduly impair the economic viability 
of the State. 104 To pervert the Referendum as a tool for stalling legisla-
tive acts which the representatives of the citizens of Maryland have in 
could not pass. Yet the voters made it clear at the polls that they supported legisla-
tive regulation of handguns in Maryland by soundly endorsing passage of the act. 
The powerful, vocal minority was defeated, and the will of the majority was accom-
plished. 
Although the legislature could tack an appropriation onto an otherwise refera-
ble act thereby removing it from referendum, it can be argued that the act still does 
not amount to an appropriation. For example, in the Dorsey case, the court stated 
that an act of general legislation "is not converted into an appropriation bill simply 
because it has engrafted upon it a section making an appropriation." Dorsey v. 
Petrott, 178 Md. 230, 251, 13 A.2d 630, 640-41 (1940) (quoting Bengzon v. Secre-
tary of Justice and Insular Auditor, 299 U.S. 410, 413 (1937)). Similarly, in 
Bengzon, the Supreme Court held that the act was a general law and that it could 
not be converted into an appropriation merely because there is an incidental provi-
sion for appropriation of public funds. Bengzon, 299 U.S. at 413-15. Indeed, Judge 
Adkins' dissent in the Kelly decision relies on this statement in arguing that the 
stadium enactments are a general law and the appropriation in chapter 124 only 
incidental. Kelly, 310 Md. at 485-87, 530 A.2d at 269 (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
However, Dorsey also states that an appropriation bill has as its primary and specific 
aim the making of an appropriation of money. Dorsey, 178 Md. at 251, 13 A.2d at 
641. The appropriations in Dorsey were meager at best. See supra notes 16-18 and 
accompanying text. Conversely, chapter 124 is very specifically designed to gener-
ate revenue and appropriate it to a specific purpose. See supra text accompanying 
notes 57, 62-65. 
101. In Bayne, the court stated that not even a budget bill was per se excluded from 
referendum. Bayne, 283 Md. at 569, 392 A.2d at 72. 
102. Winebrenner, 15 Md. at 568, 142 A. at 725. 
103. Examples might include state funding of political campaigns or a state social secur-
ity system. State funding of abortions in the Bayne case was certainly open to inter-
pretation as "new" by adopting a narrow definition of health maintenance, and 
future courts are free to narrow the interpretation of an "existing" function of 
government. 
104. The state has a legitimate interest in attracting industry, with its trappings of jobs 
and economic benefits, as well as a need to issue bonds to finance public projects. If 
the legislature's enactments appropriating funds were subject to referendum, busi-
nesses and investors would be less willing to deal with Maryland for fear that, at the 
whim of its citizenry, it could not live up to its obligations. 
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good faith enacted would allow a minority of citizens to defeat the efforts 
of the representatives of the majority. 105 Preservation of the democratic 
system of majority rule, however, is precisely the reason why the Refer-
endum was originally enacted. 106 
In Kelly, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has rendered an enlight-
ened interpretation of the Referendum which is consistent with Mary-
land precedent. By construing the exception for appropriations for 
maintaining state government broadly, the court has reaffirmed that the 
principal system of government in Maryland is a representative system of 
self-government. However, there is sufficient latitude in the reasoning of 
the Kelly decision to protect the intent of the Referendum as a safeguard 
against legislative abuses which place the will of a minority above that of 
the majority. 
Denise Ramsburg Stanley 
105. The court of appeals has characterized the Referendum Amendment as a "conces-
sion to an organized minority and a limitation upon the rights of the people." 72 
Op. Att'y Gen. 117, 122 (1987) (quoting Tyler v. Secretary of State, 229 Md. 397, 
402 (1962)). 
106. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text; see also Beall v. State ex rei. Jenkins, 
131 Md. 669, 677-78, 103 A. 99, 102 (1917). 
